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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SPRINGVILLE BANKING COMPANY,
.a corpora.tion,
Plaintiff,
VS~

C. TAYLOR BURTON~ ERNEST H.
BALCH~ WESTON E. HAMILTON~
FRANCIS FELTCH and W. J~ SMIRL,
individually and as members of the
UTAH S1'ATE RQAD COMMISSION,

Case No .
;

9066

DefendantJ. .

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENl~

OF FACTS

This is an appeal from judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake Countyj by Hon~ Stewart M. Hanson, dismissing
plaintiff)s action.
The complaint ( R. 1) was filed on February 4, 1959> and
personal service made ~pon C+ Taylor Burton and Weston E.
Hamilton, two of the named defendants, the following day.

3
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•
Believing it appropriate under Section 27·2-13 Utah Code
·
·· defl~~
A nnotate d 19 53, the Attorney General of Utali moved to
A.
•
dismiss on three grounds: ( 1) lack of subject-matter jutis-

diction; ( 2) lack of personal jurisdiction; and ( 3) fai 1ure to
state a claim upon which relief might be granted~ No affidavit
or othe~ proof was received by the Court either in support of
or in opposition to the motion.
On April 2 2~ 195 9, the Court entered a judgment of
dismissal of the action apparent} y basing its ruling solely upon
the contents of the complaint. The complaint) except for the
caption and signa turet is set ont below~
fF

1. The defendants} as members of the Utah State

Road

Commission~

are charged with the duty of acquiring rights
of way and instituting necessary actions to condemn private
property for public highway use.
2 ~ The plaintiff is now~ and for the past three years has

been continuously the owner of and in possession of a lot and
building located on the northeast corner of Seventh South
and Ma.in Streets in Springville, Utah County, Utah.

3. The said two streets have been dedicated and set apart
to the use of the public and to the special uses of the ad joining
lot owners~ as public streets and highways, and prior to the
actions of the defendants as hereinafter alleged had been used
as public streets continuously and constantly for many years.
4. In about April and May, 195 8, defendants constructed
concrete strips, or islands~ within the boundaries of Main
Street near the point at 'vhich Main and Seventh South Streets
intersect.

4
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5. The concrete islands are of such length and were con-

strue ted in such a manner that ingress and egress to and from
the plain tiff's property has been great! y impeded, and the value
of plain tiffs property h a.s been greatly depreciated~
6. The impeding of plaintiffs ingress and egress \vas
determined by defendants to be necessary £or the proper and
skillful construction of a highway for use of the public, and
the high way was skillfully and properly constructed+
7. The concrete islands are of a permanent nature and

will continue to impede ingress and egress in the manner heretofore alleged, and defendants have, for the use and benefit
of the State of Utah, damaged the plaintiff~ s property for

public use within the meaning of Article I) Section 22~ Utah
Constitution.
8. Plaintiff has never been paid or received any com-

pensation \vhatever on account of its damages by reason of
the construction as aforesaid; and the de£ en dants have asserted
that they have a right to construct and change the design of
highways in front of the plain tiffs premises at will and 'that
there l) no obligation on the part of the State of L;tah to
compens ate plaintiff for damages resulting from improvements
upon or changes in the hlghway.
·

9 ~ PI ain tiff

contends~

on the other

hand~ that the

de£ end-

antst impeding of ingress and egress to and from plain tiffs
property is a dama.ge of property -vtrithin the meaning of Article
I~ Section 2 2 of the Utah Constitution) that the damage is
compensible under the laws of the State of Uta.h~ and that as
the members of the Utah State Road Commission defendants

5

.

-~:··
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I

have an obligation to pay plain tiff £or its · damages or to
commence a proceeding pursuant to Ti tie 78, Chapter 34, Utah
Co de .Annotated 195 3~ in which plaintiff's damages can be
ascertained and assessed.
10. Although demands have been made upon them, the
de£ en dan ts have ~efused to take steps or initiate an action

against the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of Title 78,
Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 195 3.
WHEREFORE) Plaintiff prays to the court:

1. · For a declaration~ pws uan t to Title 78, Chapter 33~
Utah ~ode Annotated 195 3) that the impending of ingress and
egress to and from plain tiff's propetty, for public use, is
damage for which plaintiff is entitled to compensation wtder
the provisions of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution,
and that defendants have a duty to initiate an action pursuant
to Title 78~ Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated 1953) in which
plaintiff's damages can be ascertained and assessed.

(3) of tbe Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, compelling the de£endants to initiate
2. For an order, pursuant to Rule 65 (B)

an action against the plaintiff in the District Court of Utah

County in accordance with the provisions of Title 78~ Chapter
34, Utah Code Annotated 195 3, in · which the plaintiff may
have the amount of its damages ascertained and assessed. ••
On May 19 ~ 19 59~ the plaintiff filed its .notice of appeal
from the ord·er of dismissaL

6
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STATEMENT OF

POIN1~S

1.. The Court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter+

2. By

the impeding of ingress and egress plaintiff}s prop-

erty has been .. damaged for public use'~ within the meaning of
Article I, Section 2 2, of the Utah Constitution.
3 An action in the nature of mandamus pursuant to Rul c
r

65 (B) ( 3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate to
compel the de£ endants to initiate proceedings under which
plaintiff's damages may be ascertained and assessed.
4. If manda~us will not lie, this is a proper case for a
declaratory judgment action against the individual members of
the Road Commission.

ARGU:MENT

I

THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION·Qp THE PARTIES
AND THE SUBJECT MATTER.
Although respondents' motion to dismiss questioned the
Court's · ·j ur isdicti on over the subject matter~ and ''jurisdiction
over the persons... we question that the question 'vas meant to
be serious. Process was served personally upon C. Taylor Burton
and Weston E. Hamilton~ giving the Court jurisdiction over
those two defendants. If the motion filed by the Attorney
General in behalf o £ the defendants does not constitute a.n
appearance for the others, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction to proceed, and under the provisions of Rule 4(b) of the
j

7
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•

lil!l

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ~!the other or others 1nay be
served or appear at anytime before tria.L'J The contention
that there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter,.. is answered
by the provision of Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Con.
sti tu tion, conferring upon District Courts original juris diction
and power to issue writs of habeas corpus mandamus) in june·
tion~ quo warranto,· certiorari, prohibition, and other writs
necessary to carry in to effect their orders :t judgments· and decrees
and to give them a general control over itiferior courts and
tribunils within their respectiv~ jurisdiction, also conferring
upon them noriginal jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal} not excepted in this Constitu~ion and not prohibited by
law."' cf. Brady v, McGonagle ( 1921) 57 Utah 424, 195 Pac.
18 8) 191 The Courf s jurisdiction over the sub j oct matter is
also recognized by the provisions of Rule 6 5B and 78-3 3~ 1
Utah Code Annotated 195 3.
l

+

II
BY THE IMPEDING OF INGRESS AND EGRESS
PLAINTJ.F_F'S PROPERTY HAS BEEN· t~DAMAGED FOR
PUBLIC USEH WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE
1~

SECTION 22, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

This Court, consistent with decisions of federal courts
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has approved the
view that it is improper to dismiss a complaint for totfailure
-~to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" unless ~ it
4

appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be enti tied
to no relief under any sta.te of facts which could be proved

in support of the claim/' .recognizing that the purpose of a
8

"'
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complaint unckr our present rules of practice is to ngive the
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds
of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved." See Blackham N. Snelgfove ( 1955) 3 Utah 2d 157,
280 P.2d 453 and 2 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.) 2244.
The complaint leaves no doubt that the plaintiff is claiming
a right to be compensated for a substantial interference, by
the defendants acting in their roles as members of the Utah
State Road Commission, with the plaintiff~ s right of access to
its property. In a line of cases beginning in terri to rial days
this Court has held that the right of access to real pro petty is.
.a valuable property right which may not be taken away without
compensation.
One of the earliest cases is Dool:y Block et a! V~ Salt La_ke

Rapid T1ansit Company (1893) 9 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229} 224
L.R.A. 61 0, dealing with interference with and use of a city
street resulting from construction of railroad tracksr Noting
that the trial court had found the fee of Second South Street
to be held by Salt Lake City in trust for street uses proper the
Court concluded:
l

!tTherefore, under the law as applied to this class
of cases, plain tiffs have property rights in the street
in front of their lotsl and the street is not subject to
the absolute con tro I of the legislature, nor can the
legislature confer such control upon the city council/'
The Court affirmed the judgment enjoining the Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Company (claiming to operate under franchise from
Salt Lake City) from laying a track in the street in front of
plaintiff~ s

property.
9
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In 1Y1ortis v. Oregon Shoft Line R. Company (1909) 36
Utah 14, 102 Pa.c. 629~ an abuttip.g owner brought. action to
recover damages arising by. r~a."~on of the . ~nstiuction and
operation of a zailroad in a public street. The_ complaint alleged
that the tracks Vit'Ould be permanently used fo t the defendant· s
trains and also the trains of another rai~oad company and
(as paraphrased by the ·court) .. ~that by reason 0 f the foregoing
facts res pond ent' s property will be· ih j uriously affected; that
the ingress and egress to and from the srune will be greatly
impeded; and that by other means directly attributable to tbe
laying of

said tracks) and the operation of said trains

over

them, as stated, the value of said property has been g rea t1 y

· depreciated~'' The Supreme Court upheld a judgment fo.r the
property owner after noting that the trial court had adopted
the theory that the impeding of ingress and egress .to and from
the property because of operation of the raiiroad comes vdthin

the provisions of Article I, Section 22 of the Uta.h Constitution
that ·private property shall not be taken or damaged for p~blic
use without just compensation.n "fhe Supreme Court stated:
t

~'That an ov.rner of property, which abuts on a. public
street, has such a property right in the street that he
may, in a proper action, recover dru.nages for an interfer.ence with such right, when such interference directly·
affects his property, is too well settled by the authorities
to require a further discussion. * * * In such an action
everything which arises out of the p1oper construction
and pro per operation of the r a.il road which direct1 y
affects tbe salable value of the abutting property may
o rd inaril y be considered as· elements in ass ess~ng dam* Such an action is no different in principle
ages. *
from an action fo.r damages to· the remaining property
where a part only is condemned. T~e easement the

*

10
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abutting owner has in the street is a property tight,
and an interference with this right is, to the extent of
the interference, deemed a taking of property for
which., if such taking directly inju.tes the abutting property, as a£ ore said, the ownet may recover damages. :r:r

State v. District Court1 Fourth 1udicial District ( 193 7)
94 Utah 384~ 78 P . 2d 502, which "rill be discussed at grea.ter
length hereinafter, recognizes a right~ of access as a p.ro pe.rty
right which may not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.
~

The right of an abutting owner to recover for .nshutting

oH or interfering with his access, light~ or ait.," was recognized
by the Court again in State by State Road Commission ·t··~
Rozzelle et ux. ( 1941) 101 Uath 464, 120 P+2d 276, i~ which
both the rna jority and concurring opinions accept the principle
that abutting owners are entitled to compensation for 'otany
losses resulting from unreasonably cutting off their own access
to their property.'
:r

The right of abutters was recognized again in Boskovich

v. Midvale City Corporation ( 1952) 121 Utah
4) 5, in which the Court noted:

445~ 243

P.2d

''We have held~ in a case cited even by the defend~
ants, that if the dedicated streets of a subdivision are
laid out and right to the use thereof has arisen~ a
priva. te easement arises therein, which constitutes a
vested proprietary interest in the lot owners, which
easement survives extinguishment of any co"existing
public easement calling for .just compensation. Hence,
Mr. B cannot be cul.de-sacked by the city or the school_
board without due process of law~ and a respect for
any loss proven to have been enjoyed by him thereto11
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fore,-though such loss may not be great~ This is as it
shou~d.
since people customarily buy property in
su bdivtstons ~ part of the consideration for which is
paid on the representation. and assumption that the
~latted streets, dedicated and duly accepted, shall contlnue as a means of travel until public exigency other:Vise demands,-.in which jatter event due process and
JUSt compensat1on must enter the picture.!•

?e,

We are aware of cases denyjng an abutting owner the
tight to compeqsation for _damage·to his right of access. Other
courts have reached a variety of results, their decisions frequent! y depending upon particu]ar provisions of a· state con.
sti tu tion, e.g~, prohibiting the ·~taking~~ of property without

just compensation but not prohibiting the ~·damaging."' For
a co 11 ection of cases touching upon this and related problems
see anrtota ted, Right of Abutting Owner to Compensatio~
for Interference with Access by Bridge or Otha; Structure in
Public Street or Highway 45 A~L.R. 534 et seq.; and annotated~ '~Abutting Owner~s Right to Damages or Other Relief
4

t

;J) t

for Loss of Access Because of Limited- Access Highway or
St!eet~' ~ 43 A.L.R. 2 d 1072, 1077. Regardless of what

other

courts have done, under the U tab constitutional provision~ it
should be clear that an abutting owner may not have his -right
of access taken or substantially impaired unless he is .adequately
compensated.
·
A reasonable construction of the complaint in this case
makes it clear that the plaintiff is not seeking to recover merely
beea use of the diversion of traffic, or circuity of travel necessitated by re~ routing of a street not abutting its property, as in
Robinett v. Price ( 1929) 7 4 Utah 512, 280 Pac~ 73b It should
be clear from the complaint that plaintiff js complaining of a
12
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situation simi la.r to that considered by the Supreme Court of

Mississippi in Hanzilton et al. v. MissiJsippi State High ComminioH ( 19)4) 220 Miss. 340, 1ofe'2d 856, an action to enjoin
the highway commission from maintaining a median strip in
a highway intersecting a city street. There the Supreme Court
ts Mississippi held that the plaintiff, whose property lay along
the street and the highway, was an uabutter" on the street
and that the street could not be vacated without paying the
plaintiff compensation. To the argument that the plaintiff
had not shown that his damages were any different than other

property owners the Court noted that this is the kind of thing
which should be the subject of proof at a trial and should
not be decided on a motion for dismissal of the com plaint.
At the trial in the instant case--on the pleading filed-plaintiff
would be permitted to prove that the State Road Commission
has virtually closed two city streets as means of access to
plain tiff~ s property and created a kind of cui- de-sac.

III
AN ACTION IN THE NATURE OF MANDA:MUS
PURSUANT TO RlJLE 65B(b) (3) OF THE UTAH RULES
OF OVIL PROCEDURE IS APPROPRIATE TO COMPEL
THE DEFENDANTS TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS UNDER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES CAN BE ASCERTAINED AND ASSESSED.
The complaint having been so drawn that the plaintiffs
would be able to prove the taking of or damage to a valuable
property right without any compensation for it, the trial court
erred in dismissing the complaint unless neither a proceeding

13
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like mandamll§. under Rule 65 B, nor a declaratory judgment
action against the individual members of the road commission
is an appropriate method of determining the plaintifFs rights
or compelling the road commission members to do their duty.
Many courts have considered the problem; and having concluded that it is meaningless to talk about a ~~right \vithout a
remedy,'' hold that where property is ~t taken or damaged t~
under con.stl tu tional provisions that· prohibit '"taking or dama ging~ ~ without just compensation, the in jured property ovlner
may proceed to mandamus the proper public officers+ Mandamus
has been granted not only to require payment of an award
but to compel initiation of appropriate proceedings established
by statute for the ascertainment and as sessm.ent of damages.
The following cases are representative~ a great number hoJ ding

mandamus to be

proper~

In Dawson v. Ale Kinnon et al. ( 1939) 226 Iowa 756,
2.85 N.W. 258~ property owners sought mandamus compelling
the clefen dan ts to initiate the p.toper statu tory proceedings to
assess damages sustained by the plaintiff bee ause of the impairment of access, ingress and egress to her property. The condition had resulted £rom construction of a pub 1ic highway.
A judgment for the defendants was reversed on appeal to the
Iowa Supreme Court, that court saying:
nit is our judgment that the defendant conuniss.iooers- have taken the larger part of the drive, street,
or way over which the appellant had an easement, and
in doing so they have destroyed a property right which
she had therein~ and have very seriously interefeted
with and impaired the access which she had to and
from her land, causing her damage which she is en·

14
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titled to have established in the manner required by
l a\v.

:lo!

The doctrine announced in Dawson Vr McKinnon was
affirmed in Baird ['. Johnson ( 1941) 230 Iowa 161~ N.W~
315 and in Anderlik eta!. t;. State Highway Commission et aL
( 1949) 240 Iowa 919~ 38 N. W. 2d 605~ The latter action was
brought to compel the highway commission to institute con~
demnation proceedings for assessment of damages for construction of an approach to a vladict in the highway in front
of plaintiffs residences. After holding that the substantial
im pa irmen t of or inter£ erence with rights of access~ 1igh t ~ ai t
or view is a ntakingp within the m·eaning of the Iowa constitution the Court a gaJn held:
~~Mandamus

will lie to compel the institution of
condemnation proceedings v-lh ere there bas been a
taking of private property for public use without compensating the owner.:>'

The Supreme Court of Illinois has approved the issuance
of a \~·rit of mandamus to compel institution of proceedings
to ascertain compensation 'vhere damages to land has resulted
from the separation of grades on a highway. In People ex ret.
First J.\Tational Bank of Blue Island v. Kingery ( 1938) 369 Ill.
289, 16 N.E. 2d 761, holding a writ of mandamus to be proper,
the Court said:

Bill of Rights * * * provides that (every
person aught to find a certain remedy in the l~ws for
all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his
'~Our

person, property, or reputation; he ought to obtain,
by law, right and justice freely~ and \\'tthout being
obliged to purchase it, corn pletley and without denial,
_promptly and without delay/ All that the plaintiff

15
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in this case seeks is the right to have the judgment
of her peers as to the amount of damages, if any, she
has suffered. This writ is guaranteed by · Sect. 13 of
Ar.t. II of the Constitution of Illinois [providing that
pr1vate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation] .
~~It

is vigorously urged that the provisions of Sect.
281k of the Second State Bond Issue Act of 1923 (Ill.
Rev. Stat 1937 ~ Ch~ 121, p. 2796) and the Eminent
Domain Act~ do not contemplate the ascertainment of
damages which have already been in£icted~ and, also~
that damages resulting to an abutting proprietor} no
part of whose land is physically taken, are likew-ise not
within such contemplation. We cannot sustain these
contentions. To do 'so would violate the letter and
spirit of the Constitution~ The right of a proprietor
to damages because his property is taken or damaged
£or public use is absoi ute and it makes no difference
\~..-hether

the amount of damages is ascertained before

the injury is inflicted or after it. Giving the statute
and the Constitution any different construction would
be to annul them . '"'

The Supreme Court of \\/est Virginia consistent! y has
upheld the right to mandamus w_here property has been taken

or damaged \vithout compensation~ In Stewart r. State Road
Commission of West Virginia (1936) 117 W. \'a~ 352~ 185
S .ET 567, the cornt refused to permit a mandamus action
against the State Road Commission as .such but noted that a
property owner whose land was taken for road purposes .is
able to mandamus the commissioner in person to condemn
his land. A property owner tried this in Riggs et a!. v. State
Road Commissioner ( 1938) 120 W . Va. 298, 197 S~E. 81'~
and -vvTas successful. The Court stated:

16
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~~In their petition a.nd

proof the relators. took the
positions that, though th ete had been no taking of any
portion of their property~ it has been seriously damaged
by the new constr uction:t and that~ notw"ithstandin g
the work had been completed for five and one half
months when the petition herein was fi] ed, the respond·
en t has declined to institute proceedings to ascertain
the amount of the damages suffered by relators. They
seek mandamus to compel respondent to proceed to
have the damages settled. Respondent by ans\ver and
depositions denies that the property of relators has
been damaged.
l

·~Although

there is sharp con A.ict betvrecn the parties
in both allegation and proof respecting the alleged
damage, we are t?f the opinion that the showing made
by relators is sufficient to entitle them to have the ·con·
troversy determined in a proceeding usual for such
matters. Always, in some manner;t there must be op~
portuni ty afforded property o\vners for judicial determin a. tion . of their bona fide claims for damages to
their property on account of public improvement. Any
other conclusion would not be consonant with fundamental principles. * * *
Hin Hard.r v. SimpJon~ Road Conlmissioner, 190 S.E.
680, 683, ~le stated: !A duty rests on the State to take .
necessary steps under our condemnation statutes to
ascertain damages to the owners of priyate property,
whether the same is actualJy taken, or damaged only~

***

We conclude that the Road Commissioner may
be required to institute such proceedings as rnay be
necessary to ascertain and pay proper damages to
property o\vners where their property is either taken
or damaged; the commissioner has a reasonable dis~
cretion as to the time whe!l- such proceedings shall
be instituted, in cases of property damage only. * * *
·!

(Private property shall not be taken or damaged
17
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fo I public use ~ithout just compensation * * * .' W.
V a. Const. ~ Art. III, Sect~ 9 tIt is imperative that this
+

paramount provision of our organic law be given

t'

......ii
~uec ~

t!

The holding in Riggs et aJ v. State Road Commissioner
was affirmed and again applied to compel institution of proceedings in Appalachian Electfic Pou~er Company v. Sawyers

( 1956) 141 W. Va. 769~ 93 S.E. 2d 25.

In People ex rei~ Doyle Green et al ( 1875) 3 Hun.
( N.. Y.) 75 5 the trial court granted a .peremptory writ of
mandamus requiring confirmation of an assessment of damages
for injuries to the relator's property arising from the change
of grade o£ a N e:w York street. The appellate court affirmed
the judgment, stating with ref ere nee to mandamus:
4:~The

remedy by mandamus seems to be the appro"
priate and only one at this stage of the proceedings.
The relator has no remedy by action at law for her
damages~ * * * Her sole remedy is through the special
proceedings a utborized by statute~ and unless those
rroceedings are regularly brought to complete con~
summation, she cannot enforce payment as permitted
by the acts above referred to. Whatever official step
is essential to that end, VvT hen ever it becomes a duty
which an officer or board of officers is legally bound to
per form~ becomes also the appropriate subject of
mandamus~ if the officer refuses to perform the duty
to the prejudice of public or private rights.~~
The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
New Y ark on the basis of the opinion of the Appellate Division.

In McDowell

ux. r. City of Ashville (1983) 112 N.C+
747, 17 S.E~ 537, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld
e/
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the action of the trial court in granting mandamus: to compel
the city to assess damages to plaintiff's land pursuant to a

special statutory procedure. The Court said:
'!Now, it rna y be true~ as contended by counsel, that
the defendant alone having the power to initiate statu·
tory proceedings~ and having failed to do so, may be
treated as· a trespasser, and sued in ejectment * * *
but is is clear that such· a remedy \vould not be approw
pria te to the particular circwnstances of this case. The
defendant is still occupying the land as a street, claim·
ing it under the right of eminent domain conferred
by its charter~ and the plaintiffs evidently prefer that
the street should remain~ and therefore do not elect
to treat the defendant as a tr~spasseL Such being the
cas eJ the a propriate temedy is to compel the defendant
to assess damages as provided by its charter~ In accord·
ance with this vie\N it has often been held that man·
damus is a proper remedy in cases of this character.
Mr~ High (Extr. Rem. 31.8) says ~the writ has fre·
quently been granted to protect the rights of landowners to compensation for their lands taken in the
construction of \vorks of public improvements; and
where a ra.il,vay or other corporation is vested ~vith
the right of eminent domain, it may be compelled to
mandamus to take the necessary steps for summoning
a jury to assess damages £or the pto petty taken or
damaged.· [citing oth et' authorities]. These authorities
abundantly sustain the position that, where the statute
does not provide that the o'vner may ·institute proceedings, the party condemning~ on \vhom it is imposed the duty~ may be compelled to do so by man·
dam us. Being clearly of this opinion~ we have deemed
it unnecessary to enter in to an el abo rate discussion
of all the authorities presented by the intelligent
counsel~·'
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In GihJon v~ City Council of G1reenville ( 1902) 64 S.C.
455., 42 S.E~ 206, a property owner sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the def~idant City Council to appoint a commission
to assess the amount of damages suffered by the plain tiff
through the alteration o£ the grade of Main Street On appeal
the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the action of
the trial court in granting the writ, saying:
4

~In {an earlier

case] the City Council of Green ville
defeated an action for damages at common-law on the
ground that the statutory remedy is exc tusive, and now
attempts to defeat the remedy provided by statute on
the ground that it has not been heretofore adjudged
liable to make compensation, and that such ·liability
is denied and that such is sues carmot be determined
in the statutory remedy. This is no defense whatever
against the perfo rma.nce of its plain ministerial duty
under the statute; the undisputed facts being that W. Cr
Gibson is the owner of the lot abutting on Main Street~
in said city; that the grade of said street has been
altered by the City Council; that the lot owner claims
to have been damaged thereby, and demands compensation; that the lot owner has requested the City
Council to appoint a commissioner to assess compensation under Sect. 30 of the City Chatter; and that the
City Council has refused to make such appointment..~
:t

J

The Supreme Court of Minnesota regarded mandamus as
a proper remedy in State v. AnderJon ( 1945) 220 lvfinn~ 139~
19 N.W. 2d 7. This was an action in which the issue was
whether property owners not joined in a condemnation proceeding might intervene where· they cla.i:tned that their property
had been damaged by the in1provement In disrussing the
Minnesota condemnation statutes on the question of whether
20
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intervention should be petmitted or whether the property
owner should be required to mandamus the commissioner to
join them as parties in the condemnation proceeding, the Court
said:
~~Taking

all the statutory provisions together, it
seems not too grea.t a. strain on the judicial conscience
to hoi d that it is t hc ministerial duty of the commis
sioner to start condemnation proc eedin gs against land
that he has already subjected to damage for highway
purposes. If so, tben mandamus \Vill lie) and in the
proceeding all issues may be determined.
r

~.In this

state) a v..Tti t of mandamus is a civil action'
which give 5 the state -officers an opportunity to answer
and set up either that the land was not damaged or
that the State pro poses to remedy or has remedied the
construction which causes the damage and therefore
that it does not seek to acquire an easement or title.
The issue so raised may thus be tried in the ordinary
way by witnesses subject to cross-examination~
1

•

The Court 'vent on to adopt mandamus as the ordinary
procedure by ~Thich property o~vners may assure a hearing
on the question of damages to their property. Although th~
Minnesota statute dill ers in substantial respects from that of
Utah, the Court did recognize the need for and propriety of

mandamus.

•

In Clark v. City of Elizabeth eta!. ( 1898) 61 N .J.L. 565~
40 At l. 616, 7 37:t a property O\vne.r brought a mandamus to
corhpel the city to take appropriate action to determine damages
due rei ator for injuries to her property r csul ting from a change
of street grade. A judgment for the defendant ~vas reversed
on appeal. In discussing the appropriateness of mandamus
as a remedy the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey
21
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held that the Act of 1889 did more than confer simpIy a dis"
cretionary power notwithstanding it used the words "1t shall
be lawful for the municipal authorities in ~y such city to
make or cause to be made a proper award for damages~'' the
Court saying:
~'[This contention

cannot be yielded tor Words which~
in their ordinary acceptation~ .and when interpreted
exclusive of the context and the subject matter~ imply
a discretion or power, such as ~it shall be lawful,' and
the like~ became in the construction of statutes mandatory where such is the legislative intent. The general
rule is stated as follo1;\rs: tWhere a statute con£ ers
authority to do a judicial, or indeed, any other, act,
which the public interest or even individual right may
demand, it is. imperative on those so authorized to
exercise the authority when the case arises, and its
·exercise is duly applied for by a party interested) and
having a right to make the application.' * * *
_t

.* * * The power [to assess damages] is one that
exists for the bene:fi t of the persons injured by such
public improvements a.s the parties in teres ted~ and the
authority to have an assessment of damages made is
~~

a power given for their benefit, and, although expressed in language in form discretionary, it is in reality
upon settled 1ega 1 pr incipIes imperative.~
t

The view that mandamus is available as a. remedy to
compel initiation of condemnation proceedings was aflirmed in
Empire TruJt Company v. Board of Commerce and Navigation
et al. (1940) 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752') in which the Court
refused declaratory rei ie£ on the ground that it was not maintainable, under New Jersey practice, if another adequate remedy
\'oJ' as a vailab 1e~ and mandamus -=·commanding the institution
22
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of condemnation proceedings to fix compensation for lands

taken J' was available to petitioner.
The tig~t to mandamus has been. recogp.ized~ also, tn a

number of other cases. See Folmar v. Brantley et al. (1939)
238 Ala~ 681~ 193 So. 122, in which the Court denied mandamL~S
because the ·right to relief was not shown but recognized that
mandamus is a proper remedy where condemnation has not
been br~ught; People v. Sass ( 1898) 179. Ill. 357, 49 N.E .
.501 ~ in volvin g the power of a city to sell property for special
assessments v..!here the property upon v./hich the improvement
was placed had not been .first acquired by the condemnation,
and in which the Court held that whether th~ prope tty has
be~n acquired made no difference since the property owner has
other remedies~ among which is man dam us to C'?m pel the city
to condemn the property; Klaus v. Mayor of Jefsey Cit"y ( 1903)
69 N.J~L.· 127, 54 Atl. 220, \Vhich \\-'"as an .action in mandatnu.s
to compel city authorities to have a proper award· made and
the mandamus was granted; i11aunt Vernon Realty Corporation
v. City of Mount Vern on ( 1934) _241 App. Div. 882, 2 71
N.Y.S+ 742] in ";rhich an action for damages was dismissed but
~t was held that an abutter whose property is damaged by a
change of grade is limited to the statutory temedy of condemnation) t~and in event such proceedings are. not brought he
may mandamus the municipality to institute them''; and State
v~ J?oard.of SuperviJors, etr~ of Tatun of Leon ( 1896) 66 Wis.
199~ 28 N.W. 140, in which a writ of mandamus ~~as hcJd
to be a proper means of compelling in~tiation of procc~dings

to

asse~s d~ges.

· This Court has never directly decided the question of
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whether mandamus ~s available to compel the individual
members of the State Road Commission to initiate condem~
nation proceedings. It has held that they may be en joined from
ptoceeding with construction of a project if the construction
will damage property of an abutting O\Vner and no proceedings
for condemnation have been initiated. StateJ by State Road
Commission et a£~ v . District Court, Fourth Judicial DiJtrict
( 193 7) 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502. In the above cited case~
the Court went a. 1ong way toward clarifying the rights of
the individual as against the rights of the State in the con~
struction of pub lie improvements. It held~ in making permanent
a \V ri t prohibiting the District Court from proceeding directly
against the State Road Commission as such~ that a suit against
the Commission is a suit against the State and that the State's
cloak of inununi ty fits the State Road Commission as well.
The Court was not confronted directly with the question of
whether mandan1us will lie. However, at page 509 of the
Pacific Reporter the Court quote~ with approval language of
the Supreme Court of West Virginia in which it was stated
that mandamus against the commissioner would lie to com pel
condemnation of a property owner~s land~
Our Rule 6 5B (b) provides tha. t if there is no other plain,
speedy and .adequate remedy relief rna y be obtained:
~~where

the relief sought is to compel any in£ erior
tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to pet£orm an act which the law specially en joins as a duty
resulting fro1n an office~ trust or action; * * *
j •

The plaintiff cannot bring its action against the State
because the State has not consented to be sued; under the
24
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decision in the fourth District Couft case) neither will an
action lie directly ·against the State Road Comtnission; under
the decision in H jorth v.. Whittenburg ( 1952) 121 li~ 324,
2·i 1 P.2d 907, qamages cannot be recovered from ind~vid~~l
members of the State Road Commission for injury to .prope~ty
~·i thout condemnation. Accordingly, if the plaintiff is . not ,
able to compel the defend ants~ through issuance of mandamus
pursuant to Rule 6SB(b) (3) the plaintiff if left 1\~"ith only the
diffuse aroma of a .~~remediless
right;'l Where injunction is avail.
able to protect the quick and the clairvoyant, mandamus ought
to be available to protect the rest of us. As this Court said in th_e
Fourt District Court case:
~~we are

of the opinion that v,..:here private property
1s taken or damaged for public use, as is a] leged in
the complaint in the injunction suit,· without any agreement Vt~"ith the owner for compensation, and Vl/lthout
any proceedings for· assessment in the 1nanner ·pro.vid ed by the statute relating to eminent domain,. a court
of equity may properly take jurisdiction where the
only remedy remaining to the land o~~rner is to present
a claim to the. ·Board of Examiners.t~

It is inconceivable that the Court's consoling statement
to the losing plaintiffs in Hjorth t·. Wh·ittenburg-that relief
might be obtained from the Board of Examiners~\vas meant
as a renunciation of the point of view so carefully spelled out
in the Fourth District Court case:
t~

* * * Under the statutes of Utah relating to emi~

nent domain, and under the constitutional provisions
of U tab herein referred to,. the p1a in tiffs in tb e in j unction suit cannot be compelled to submit to the legislature or the Board of Exa.m.iners the question whether
their property has b ecn damaged by the construction
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complained of nor the question of what amount will
compensate them for such damage. ~t
In the above holding the Court recognized that the courts,
not the legislature or the Board o£ Examiners~ were established
by the Constitution for the protection of minority rights . The
political arm of the government ptotects the rights o£ the
rnaj ori ty; it iJ the rna jor ity. Its decisions can be based on whim
or political expediency. But our Constitution protects the indi-

vidual by providing that just compensation shall be paid for
damage to property for public use (Art I, Sec. 22) ; that the
constitutional provisions are mandatory and prohibitory (Art.
I, Sec. 2 6) ; and that the Courts shall be open to every person
so that he may ~chave remedy by .due course of J..a,v·' for injury
to him or his property (Art. I~ Sec. 11) These provisions are
met not by permitting supplicants to ask for compensation
but by permitting plaintiffs to demand it.
+

IV
IF MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE, THIS IS A PROPER
CASE FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
AGAINST THE INDJVJDUAL MEMBERS OF THE ROAD

COMMISSION.
Appellant recognizes that one of the conditions for grant·
ing the extraordinary remedies provided by Rule 6SB~ Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure) is that ~~no other plain~ adequate and
speedy remedy exists.·~ Some courts have held mandamus to

be improper where relief could be obtained through a
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decla.ra~

tory judgment action; appellants therefore included tn the
complaint a] legations of a controversy with the members of
the Road Commission concerning the appellant's rights and
the commission memberst duties under the constitution and

statutes of Utah. The prayer of the complaint asked, alternately, for an order pursuant to Rule 65B(b) (3) and a. decla-ration~ pursuant to Title 7 8~ Chapter 3 3, Utah Code Annotated

1953.
It is provided in 78-33-2 Utah Code .Annotated 1953 that:

·'Any person in teres ted under a

deed~

ill or written
. contract or whose rights~ status or other Jegal r e lations
are affected by a statute~ municipal ordinance, contract
or franchise, may have determined any question of con~
struction or validity. arising under th~ instrument,
statute, ordinance, con tract or franchise and obtain a.
declaration of rights~ status or other legal relations
thereunder.
\V

J:>

An action against a public official is not a ~·suit against
the Statetj, where it is brought to compel the pctformance of
a ministerial duty. This has long been accepted. In H aus ton v:
Ormes ( 1920) 252 U.S. 469~ 40 S. Ct. 369~ 64 L. Ed. 667,
it was contended that because the object of the suit and the
effect of the decree were to compel action by government
officers ln the performance of their official duties the suit was·
in effect one against the United States. But the Supreme Court
of the United States said:
~

~~But*

~

* *it is clear that the officials of the Treasury

are chatged with the ministerial duty to make pay-__
tnent on demand to the person designatedr It is settled
that in such a suit a case brought by the person entitied
to the performance of the duty against the official
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charged with its performance is not not a suit against
~he government. So it has been declared by this Court
tn many cases relatj ng to state officers .
1

'

In Minnesota v. Hitchcock ( 1901) 185 U.S. 373} 22 S. Ct.

65 0, 46 L. Ed. 954~ the Court held that although a suit against
' officers of the United States might be in effect a snit against
the United States, whether it was or not depe~ded upon what
was sought to be accomplished.
t~Of course~ this statement (that the State, though
not named~ rna y be the real party in interest] had no

reference to and did not include those cases in which
officers of the United States are sued!t in appropriate
form, to compel them to perform some ministerial duty
imposed upon them by law~ and which they wrong·
fully neglect or refuse to perform. Such suits would
not be deemed suits against the United States within
the rule that the government cannot be sued except
by its consent nor within the rule established within

_the Ayers

case_~~

So it doesn't seem to make much

·action is for mandamus
of the appellantst claims
tive officers to perform
order to the defendants

difference whether the

or for a declaratory judgment Each

for relief seeks to compel administra·
their ministerial duty. A mandatory
might be issued under 78-33-8 Ctah

Code Annotated 1953+
The court in State v. District Court~ Fourth Judicial DtJtrict
( 1937) 94 Utah 384> 78 P . 2d 502~ supra~ held that a suit
against the individual members of the Utah State Road Com~
mission to enjoin them from proceeding with construction
of a high way was not a suit against the State. There is no
valid distinction between that case and an action for mandamus
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or declaratory relief. This court has 4ecided cases on the medts
although brought against state officers or boards. ·see~ ·fo·r
example~ UniverJity of Utah v. Boat-d of Examinefs of State
of Lltah et al. (1956) 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d .348;: and
Bateman v. BoaJ"d of Examiners. of the State of Utah ( 1958}
7 Utah 2d 221, 332 P.zd 381.

CONCLUSION
Under the complaint in this case the appellant would have
been entitleq to prove that it was an abutter on both Main 3:nd

Seventh South Streets in Springville; and that the defendants,
acting as members of the Utah State Road Cotnmission, had
constructed certain barriers within Main Street.

Appellant

w9uld be entitled to show that access to and from its property
by way of either Seventh South Street or Main- Street was .sub·
stantially affected and that the property might not be usable
by anyone except folks coming from Thistle. Appellant \\'Ould
also be entitled to shOW that it has not been COlli pen sated for
the damage to

its property; that the defendants have refused

to comp~nsate it~ disclaiming any obligation to do

50 7

and

asserting that even if there is such an obJigation, there is no
way for the a ppell.an t to en£ orce it. This .represents the kind
of '~due process}~ problem that the United States Supreme Court
turned a\vay fr~m in .M.artin v. Creasy ( 1959), U.S. 79 S~ Ct.
3 L. Ed+ 2d 1186t but will probably have to look in the face
before asphalt completely replaces turf ...

The trial court should not have dismissed the action. The

complaint stated a claim upon which relief (one type or the
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other) can be granted+ If injunction is a proper remedy against
individual members o£ the Road Commission) mandamus and

declaratory judgment are just as proper. To deny the appellants
the relief sought in this action would be to make two distinctions, by the making of which relief of parties would depend
not so much upon the merits of their. causes, but upon a happenstance. A party could protect himself or notJ ~epending upon
whether he was able to act quickly enough to enjoin construcw
tion, or could fotesee the kind of dat:riages that might result
from it. Another parqls tights might depend upon whether
the Road Commission were able to reach a settLement with
all of the property owners atong the route being constructed
or tepaired, for if the C..ommission were not able to arrive
at a settlement and had to condemn property owners might,
under the provisions of 78-34-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
intervene in an action as parties and have their dam.ages determined .

The trial court erred in dismissing the action~ The judgment should be reversed a.nd the case remanded for further

proceedings.
Respectfully submitted~
Bryce E. Roe

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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